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Comparative Analysis of Central Bank Acts. 
Bank of Tanzania Act, 1965 
Bank of Kenya Act, 1966 
Bank of Uganda Apt, 1966 
In making this comparative analysis I shall eoncentrate on those 
matters in which the three banks differ; there are of course numbers Df 
matters on which the legislation is identical or virtually identical. 
Thus, all the East African banks are to be sol'e banks of issue, taking 
over assets and liabilities from the Currency Board, and they are all 
to have the same legal status, namely, that of a body corporate, with 
perpetual succession and a common seal which may sue or be sued in its 
corporate name. 
The first matter in which there are subtle differences is the 
statement of the objects of the banks. It is not suggested that the 
operations of the bank will be very significantly different because of 
differences in fine shades of meaning in the objects stated in the 
legislation. In general, central bank legislation differs very 
considerably in this characteristic, ranging from Acts which specify 
no general objectives at all, such as that of the Bank of Rhodesia and 
the Act which established its predecessor bank, the Bank of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, neither of which specify any general objective at all. 
At the other extreme, the Monetary Law Act of Ceylon specifies fairly 
comprehensive objectives as follows: 
(a) the stablisation of domestic monetary values; 
(b) the preservation of the par value of the Ceylon 
rupee and the free use of the rupee for current 
international transactions; 
(c) the promotion and maintenance of a high level of 
production, employment and real income in Ceylon; and 
(d) the encouragement and promotion of the full deve 
lopment of the productive resources of Ceylon. 
Moreover it goes on to set out in-two long sections the matters to be 
taken into consideration and action to be taken in'connection with 
domestic monetary stabilisation and international monetary stabilisation 
respectively. Of the two extremes, saying nothing is probably better 
than cluttering up the central bank with preconceived notions of how it 
shall perform its functions. The East African Acts confine themselves 
to fairly succinct statements of the basic objectives, which are 
contained within sections of the Acts in the case of Kenya and Tanzania, 
but in the preamble to the Act in the case of Uganda. 
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Section 4 of Kenya's Act reads: 
"The principle objects of the Bank shall-be-to 
regulate the issue of notes and coins, to assist 
in the development and maintenance of a sound 
monetary, credit and banking system in Kenya 
conducive to the orderly balanced economic deve-
lopment of the country, and the external stability 
of the currency, and to serve as banker and fina-
ncial adviser to the Government". 
Tanzania's Act., Section 5(2) reads: 
"Within the context of the economic policy of the 
Government the activities of the Bank shall be 
directed to the promotion of credit- and exchange 
conditions conducive to the rapid growth of the 
national economy of Tanzania, due regard being had 
to the desirability of fostering monetary stability". 
The preamble to the Bank of Uganda Act reads as follows: 
"An Act to establish the Bank of Uganda which shall 
issue legal tender currency and maintain external 
reserves in order to safeguard the international 
value of that currency, promote stability and a sound 
financial structure'conducive to a balanced and 
sustained rate of growth of the economy and other 
purposes connected therewith". 
There is probably general agreement about the threefold objective 
of monetary policy, that is to say, internal stability, external balance 
and'a high rate of growth. The real trouble arises where these are not 
consistent in the policy that they require. The wording in which these 
objectives are expressed is not very important, but the relative weight 
" that is given to them may be significant. There can be no doubt about 
the emphasis in the preamble of the Bank of Uganda Act: the stress Is 
clearly upon safeguarding the international value of the currency and 
promoting stability and a sound financial structure. The words chosen 
in connection with the rate of growth are such as to minimise any 
possible conflict between.this and the primary objectives. 
The Central Bank of Kenya (or the Banki Quu ya Kenya) is modest, in 
that its objective Is only to assist in the development and maintenance 
of a sound system, conducive to the orderly and balanced development of 
the country and the external stability of the currency. Here it is an 
orderly and balanced development to which the financial,system Is to be 
conducive. -
The Bank of Tanzania is first of all firmly put in its place 
viz-a-viz government because its objectives are defined- 'within the 
context of the economic policy of the government'. Of course; this must 
be so for any centra.1 bank, and there is probably nothing very sinister 
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in saying it, or in leaving it out. But it is perhaps suggestive that 
the Bank of Tanzania is to be directed, 'to the promotion of credit and 
exchange conditions conducive to rapid growth1. There then follows the 
qualification to this, 'due regard being had to the desirability of 
fostering monetary stability'. What this means depends upon how much 
regard is thought to be due to monetary stability but we can deduce from 
the ordering 6f these objectives something which is not surprising, 
namely that Tanzania is in a hurry. This does not constitute a bad 
mark from the confidence point of view, as many people might suppose, 
because an African government which is not in a hurry may not be very 
stable. 
Turning to the actual constitutions of the banks, they all have in 
common, management by a Board, which in the cases of Kenya and Uganda 
comprises a Governor, Deputy Governor and a number of directors; Tanzania 
differing only in having a Director General in place of Deputy Governor. 
In all cases the Governor and Deputy Governor (Director General) are 
appointed for four years, and eligible for reappointment; in the case 
of Uganda for five years and eligible for reappointment; in the case of 
Tanzania no term is specified in the legislation. Uganda specifies that 
the Governor and Deputy Governor shall be persons of recognised financial 
and banking experience, but the Tanzanian and Kenyan Acts are silent on 
this point. The Kenya Bank is to have four directors, the Tanzanian Bank 
five directors, and the Uganda Bank between five and seven directors. 
In no case is any qualification for directors laid down in the 
legislation though there are the usual disqualification of persons 
of un-sound mind, bankrupts, and felons. Practice regarding qualifica-
tions differs considerably among the central banks of English - speaking 
Africa: the Bank of Rhodesia, not only specifies that the directors shall 
be engaged in financial commercial, industrial or agricultural pursuits, 
but allocates a number of directors to each of these fields; the Banks of 
Nyasaland and Malawi both require that the directors shall be of 
recognised standing and experience in business professional or academic 
fields; the most nebulous requirement is that of Zambia which requires that 
they shall be 'persons of. recognised standing'. The fact that the East 
African banks have not thought fit to commit themselves even to this 
qualification is probably not a significant indication of contrary 
intentions. 
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The most important distinction which must be made in respect 
of the composition of the Board, and indeed the constitution of the 
Banks, is the fact that both Kenya and Tanzania legislate for the 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury to be a full voting member Of their 
respective Boards. Uganda, on the other hand, has maintained what might 
be described as the British tradition of excluding government from the 
deliberations and decisions of the Board; cnly in Ghana among 
speaking African countries is there a government representative on the 
Board, but this is quite common elsewhere. The advantage is that it 
maintains close contact between the Ministry of Finance and the central 
bank, and that the Ministry of Finance is aware of the problems, with 
which the central bank is trying to deal, and is able, in this contex, 
to present the government's financial policy to the Board. 
On the other hand, there is considerable strength.in the argument that 
government representation confuses a vital issue by involving the 
government on both sides of the counter. Ultimately the government 
view must, of course, prevail; but the Board is likely to assess the 
requirements of the monetary situation much more clearly and objectively 
if one of its major borrowing customers is not one of its members. That 
the government's policy must ultimately be paramount is clearly recognised 
in the Uganda legislation: Section 45 of the Act, (Minister's powers of 
Direction) reads as follows: 
The Minister may, after consultation with the 
Governor, give directions of a general nature 
relating to the financial and economic policy 
of the Bank, and the Bank shall be bound to 
comply. 
This makes the relationship clear-cut and unambiguous; the Board is 
autonomous in its deliberations and decisions, but these decisions are 
ultimately subject to direction from the government. 
The government's ultimate authority is secured in the case of 
Kenya via the right of the Treasury representative (shared with the 
Governor) to suspend a. vote and refer the matter to the Minister, whose 
decision is binding. In the case of Tanzania the Governor or Treasury 
representative may require a decision of the Board to be postponed for 
seven days, and although there is no explicit provision'for reference in 
such case to the Minister, it is clear that such reference would, be made 
on any questions of conflict, and that the outcome would be the same as 
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that specified in the Kenya Act. 
Turning to the provisions for the capital of the hanks, one is 
tempted to make the cynical comment that these appear to have been 
determined by a competitive auction with the object of establishing 1 
confidence. Thus, Tanzania started off by specifying a capital of £1 
million, Kenya followed with £1.3 millions, and Uganda resoundingly 
capped these two bids by specifying a capital of £2 millions. The ratio 
of these figures to the volume of total commercial bank deposits, 
respectively, is as follows: Tanzania 2*2 percent; Kenya 1.8 percent, 
Uganda 5.7 percent. The provisions regarding the accumulation of 
reserves differ considerably in the percentage of profit to be. put 
to reserve as the reserve grows relative to capital. These requirements 
are set out in the following table, which also whows the way in. which 
the combined capital and reserves of the Banks will accumulate after 
five years, after ten years and the final position, on the assumption 
that only the specified minimum provision is made for reserves. The rable 
assumes a constant profit equal to that earned by the Currency Board in ^ 
1964/65, shared between the three Central Banks on. the basis of the 
currency distribution as estimated by the Board in the 1965 Report. 
CAPITAL AMD RESERVES 
Total Capital Plus Reserves Xlviinimum).. 
£ M On 
Establishment 
After 
5 years 
After 
10 years 
Finally Minimum % of Profit 
to Reserves 
Kenya 
Annual Profit £j.2n 1.3 2.8 2.8 2.8 
R £1.3: 
Tanzania • 
Annual Profit £1.5m 1.0 2.35 3.1 4.0 
R < £lm: 
25^' 
R <" £3m: 
1 2 ^ 
Uganda 
Annual Profit £l.lm 2.0 4.15 4.9 6.0 
R < £lm: 
10Cf5? 
R < £2m: 
R <£4: 
12^5 
Assumptions (i) That no more provision for Reserves is made than is specified 
in the cts. 
(ii) That profits of the three banks together average out at the 
profit earned by-the Currency Board in 1964/5. 
(iii) That profits acrue to the Banks in proportion to estimated 
currency distribution. 
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ffe turn now to a consideration of-the provisions for the unit of 
currency and its value. All three countries retain the shilling 
(with a small s in each case) as the unit of currency. Only Kenya diffe-
rentiates. -it::as a Kenya shilling. All are divided into one hundred cents, 
and similar provisions are made for the legal tender status of the 
currency. 
No doubt, in spite of the fact that the law lays down that the unit 
of account in Uganda and Tanzania shall be the shilling, this will 
eventually become, in common practice, the Uganda and Tanzania shillings. 
It is questionable, however, whether the failure to specify the national 
differentiation of the shilling might not lead to considerable legal 
\ 
difficulties in connection with obligations expressed simply in shillings. 
In fact, however, large sums, including government accounts, official 
statistics and Central Bank Report, will continue, as at 'present, to be 
expressed in poinds. Only Kenya recognised this in its legislation by 
including a clause reading "twenty shillings shall equal one Kenya pound". 
Thus Kenya seems to have covered the matter fully, providing for the 
distinctive character of the Kenya shilling and providing also for the 
fact- that for large sums the unit of account is the pound, although the 
Kenya shilling is the unit of currency. 
.It seems a pity that Kenya, explicitly by its reference to the pound, 
and Uganda and Tanzania implicitly, by the fact, that the pomnd will 
continue to be used as a unit of account, have not grasped the opportunity 
for a complete conversion to the decimal system. This was done very simply 
by Sierra Leone in 1963, when the Central Bank and independent monetary 
system was established. The new unit of account and currency is the Leone, 
which is equal to one hundred cents, the par value of which is 1.24414 
grains of gold, eleven twelfths fine, which is equal to ten shillings 
sterling at the present par value. Sierra Leone has thus provided itself 
with a unit of account which is sufficiently large to enable it to be 
used conveniently for the expression of sums running into tens of millions 
of pounds, and which is much more convenient even for small transactions. 
The same method was employed when the Rand replaced the pound in the 
Republic of South Africa. The strong desire for each country to maintain 
the continuity of the name of the unit of account has prevented the same 
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rational solution in East Africa, Had each country invented a new name 
for its unit of account, and each made this unit divisible into ten 
shillings, all the advantages of the decimal system could have been 
obtained with the minimum departure from continuity, since the shillings 
would then have continued as at present, but there would have been a 
national differentiation of the unit of account which would have prevented 
any legal confusions resulting from the lack of such differentiation. 
In all three cases the Acts provide that the par value of the unit of 
currency shall be determined in accordance with international agreements. 
In Kenya and Tanzania the par value is to be determined by the President 
on the advice of the Bank, and in Uganda by the Minister on the 
recommendation of the Board. All three Acts specify that the deviations 
from the par value of the currency shall not exceed one per cent, this 
being the margin laid down by the International Monetary Fund of which 
all the countries are members. In this connection it is interesting to 
note that Uganda is the only case in which the Act actually specifies 
that the national currencies shall be convertible. This is secured in 
the Bank of Uganda Act by Section 20' (Obligation in respect of Currency) 
which' reads as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of any enactment 
relating to exchange control and of this section, 
• the Bank, 
a. shall on demand buy and sell the shilling against 
sterling; 
b. may buy and sell the shilling against gold or 
other currencies eligible for inclusion in the 
the reserve of external assets specified in Par.B 
of Subsection 1 of Section 24 of this Act. 
It is the obligation under (a), that the Bank 'shall on demand buy 
and sell the shilling against sterling', which differentiates the Bank of 
Uganda Act from the other two Acts. Since both Kenya and Tanzania have 
stated their intention of maintaining the convertibility of their 
currencies, and since any departure from convertibility would be by some 
stipulation in an enactment relating to exchange control to which this 
obligation is subject in the Uganda Act, the absence of such an 
obligation is probably not significant. A similar obligation appears in 
the central bank legislation of Malawi and Zambia, but not in that of 
the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, now defunct, nor in that of the other 
successor bank - the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia. In fact Malawi and Zambia 
are the only two of the English-speaking African countries which have 
legislated explicitly for conversion into sterling. 
It is possible that the second Subsection of Section 20 in the Bank 
of Uganda Act may confuse others, as it did the present writer, at first 
reading; it reads: 
"For the purpose of paragraph (a) of the 
preceding subsection, 
(a) the rates of exchange quoted by the Bank for 
spot transactions shall not differ by more 
than one per centum from the parity of the 
shilling with the parity of sterling declared 
by the International Monetary Fund". 
This, does not mean that the present exchange rate viz-a-viz sterling 
is built into the Act; it simply specifies the one per cent margin in 
terms of the 'cross rate' on sterling parity, thus fixing a rate at which 
Uganda shillings shall be converted into sterling independently of the 
direct exchange rate between sterling and the Uganda shilling which may 
be established by their relative par values at any particular time. 
Thus, if sterling were to be devalued, the- rate at which the Bank of 
Uganda woald be bound by this section to deal in sterling, is the rate 
implied by the new parity of sterling declared to the International 
Monetary Fund, unless, of course, the Minister, on the. recommendation of 
the Board, determines a new parity for the value of the Ugandan shilling, 
which he is empowered to do by statutory instrument at any time. 
We turn now to the limits which are imposed by the legislation on 
the ability of the central banks to create credit. As a direct comparison 
is somewhat complicated it will be convenient to divide the provisions in 
the legislation into three sections: (a) short term advances to Government 
(b) holdings of government securities; and (c) the aggregate amount of 
loans outstanding in favour of government, 
(a) Short term advances. 
The provision for short term advances to government is smilar in the 
Tanzanian and Ugandan Acts; such advances are not to exceed twenty per 
cent of recurrent revenue in the case of Tanzania, and are limited to 
three hundred days; in the case of Uganda short term advances axe limited 
to fifteen per cent of recurrent revenue, and must not remain outstanding 
for more than three months after the end of the financial year in v/hich 
they are contracted. Wot only do the Acts, in both cases, ensure the 
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short term nature of these advances but the purpose of them is explicitly 
stipulated in both Acts. In the case of Uganda the wording is 'advances 
in respect of temporary deficiencies of recurrent revenue'; in the case 
of Tanzania the wording, which contains a curious linguistic inaccuracy, 
is as follows: 'The Bank may make direct advances to the Government for 
the purpose of offsetting fluctuations between receipts from the budget 
revenue and payments of the Government'. There cannot, of course,be 
fluctuations "between" revenue and payments, but it is clear that the 
intention is to provide for offsetting unsynchronised fluctuations 
in revenue and payments. The Uganda Act provides for this more 
succinctly by referring to 'deficiencies in recurrent revenue' which 
will presumably be interpreted as deficiencies relative to recurrent 
expenditure. It is however a nice point whether the Bank could resist 
requests for advances in respect of non-recurrent payments for which 
recurrent revenue was "temporarily" deficient. Be that as it may, the 
limits are in both cases cleaxly stated and unambiguously confined to 
short term purposes by the stipulated time limits. 
The Kenya Act permits direct advances to government bul pahs Hir> 
limit to government borrowing on the aggregate of such direct advances 
plus total government securities heldo This provision therefore falls 
to be considered under Section c<. 
(b) Government security holdings. 
Here it is necessary to make a. distinction between the limits which 
are set to securities in terms of maximum life to maturity, and the 
limits which are set to the total holding of government securities 
including long term securities. Kenya specifies that the total holding 
of securities with more than twelve months to run shall not exceed 
£3 million. Uganda allows the Bank only to buy securities of the 
Government maturing within tv.renty-five years and specifies a .limit on 
securities having more than twenty-four months to run equal to thirty 
per cent of the demand liabilities of the Bank. At the outset the demand 
liabilities of the Bank will be equal to currency outstanding plus such 
deposits as the government and the commercial banks transfer to the new 
bank. The figure represented by this limitation is not at present 
capable of precise calculation, but it will probably not exceed £6m when 
the Bank is established, In contrast with Kenya, where the limit is 
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an absolute one, the limit in the case of Uganda will increase with tfre 
increase in the Bank's demand liabilities. Tanzania prescribes on 
overall limit of an amount equal to twenty-five per cent of average 
ordinary revenue and further prescribes that no more than an amount 
equal to ten per cent of annual ordinary revenues shall be in securities • 
which mature later than twelve months from the date of aquisition by the 
Bank. Calculating, as specified in the Act, on the basis of revenue 
during the three preceedirg financial years, the current limit would be 
about £7=5 million and £3 million respectively, 
(c) Limit on aggregate lending to governments. 
The Kenya Act provides that thw total of direct advances, plus. the. 
total of government securities purchased by the Bank, plus government-
securities held as collateral for loans, shall not exceed a fixed amount 
of £12 million. It is specified that the securities taken over from the 
Currency Board are not to count for the purpose of implementing this limit. 
The limitation therefore applies ~o all future credit creation in favour 
of government together with government securities held against loans, for 
example to the banks,, Being an absolute limit expressed in money terms 
it will certainly require amendment eventually. Tanzania, as we have 
already seen., provides for a limita.tion on short term advances, of an 
amount equal to twenty per cent of average ordinary revenue. In addition 
it prescribes a limit equal to twenty five per sent of average ordinary 
revenue $t>r total securities held at any one time by the Bank including 
both those purchased by the Bank and those held as collateral security 
for loans given by the Bank* Culculating as specified in the Act on the 
basis of average ordinary revenue during the three financial years imme-
diately preceeding the year in which the calculation is made, the combined 
limit would, currently, be ,£12 million approximately. "When we turn to 
Uganda it is somewhat surprising to find that the Act prescribes no 
overall limit to the amount of lending to the Government. The only two 
limitations specified in the Act are those with which we have already 
dealt, namely, the fifteen per cent of recurrent ordinary revenue cn short 
term advances, and the limit equal to thirty per cent of demand liabilities 
on securities exceeding twenty four, months to maturity. It would seem, 
therefore, that there is no limit prescribed to the amount of securities 
with less than twenty four months to run which the Bank may hold. This 
of course would include Treasury Bills, which in the United Kingdom, in 
spite of the fact that they were originally intended to offset deficiencies 
of revenue and to he instruments for temporary borrowing, now constitute 
a substantial part of the permanent national debt of the United Kingdom. 
It Is true that in Uganda's case the liquidity of the securities over 
which no limit is specified would ensure that the Bank technically had 
the whip hand in that it could run them off within a comparatively short 
period of time, assuming that the maturity was evenly distributed. 
Nevertheless it does mean that in respect of this form of borrowing there 
is no absolute limit to which the Government can be referred by the Bank 
except that relating to the minimum external reserve which in Uganda's 
case is expressed in terms of the Bank's liabilities. It is perhaps worth 
pointing out that the same prima facie gap occurs in the legislation 
relating to the Central Banks of Sierra Leone and Zambia, and the now 
defunct Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Indeed, in the case of the latter 
bank, no restriction on lending to government is specified at all, and in 
the case of Zambia there is no limit except with regard ;to short term 
advances, although it is only allowed to purchase government securities 
which mature within twenty five years. In all other cases of centr»l hanks 
in English-speaking Africa there is an overall limit on the amount of 
central bank lending to the government. (Summary in Appendix One). 
We examine next the powers of control that these banks have been 
given over financial institutions which are in all cases pretty 
comprehensive. In respect of minimum cash reserves all three Acts 
allow the Central Bank to specify the minimum balances which must be 
held with the Central Bank by the commercial banks and allow them to 
differentiate with respect to different kinds of liabilities. In all three 
cases the maximum balances which can be required is set at twenty per cent 
of the total liabilities of the comercial banks; Kenya and Tanzania 
specify thirty days notice for a change in such requirments, but Uganda 
states that the period of grace shall be specified by the Bank. In all 
cases it is specified that the regulations shall be uniform for all banks. 
None of the Acts explicitly empowers the Central Banks to prescribe 
liquidity ratios, which is surprising, considering that it is only be such 
a control that a central bank can prevent a banking system based upon an 
external money market from frustrating attempts to control bank expansion 
- 12 -
via a cash ration.. This was .soon discovered by the Bank of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland which had to amend itc legislation to introduce compulsory 
minimum liquidity ratios which could be prescribed and varied from time 
to time by the Bank. The neglect to provide this weapon specifically 
presumably means, assuming that it i;> not proposed to close access to 
London ent rely by exchange control, that the present fully loaned up 
position of the commercial banks i:; assumed ly the authorities to guarantee 
a. closed position. 
With regard to control of interes'- rates, Kenya and Tanzania restrict 
themselves to specific provisions in respect of interest on deposits only. 
Thus, the Kenya Act prescribes that tho Bank may determine maximum rates 
paid by specified banks on deposits, while the Tanzania Act prescribed 
that maximum, or minimum rates on deposits may be prescribed by the Bank, 
Uganda's explicit provisions ir_ this matter are more comprehensive, in 
that the Bank is empowered to prescribe maximum or minimum rates of ' 
interest on deposits or other liabilities and on credit extended in any' 
form. 
So much for the specific powers s 5t out in the Act. These are In 
each case supplemented by very wide general powers which it will be best 
to quote verbatim. The relevent provisions in Lhc A<vl c.i-o m w b i n ^ 
in Sections 40 and 41, which are as follows: 
40. (l) The Bank may issue instructions specifying in 
respect of any loans., advances or investments 
made by specified banks -
(a) the purposes for which they may or may not 
be granted, 
(b) the maximum maturities or, in the case of 
loans and advances, tho type and minimum, 
amount of security which shall be required, 
and in the case of letbers of credit, the 1 : 
minimum amount of margin deposit; or 
(c) the limits for any particular categories 
of loans, advances or investments or for 
their total amount outstanding. 
Section 41 reads as follows: 
41.(l) The Bank may issue instructions designed to 
control the volume, terms and conditions of 
credit, including instalment facilities, in 
the form of loans, advances or investments, 
extended by specified financial institutions. 
In both cases the second subsection provides for the gazetting of the 
instructions and for their uniform application. It "is very difficult 
to imagine that a central bank would ever wish to dp anything which does 
not come within the very wide terms of these powers, 
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The Bank of Tanzania Act gives the Bank controls which are specified 
in Sections 49 and 50 as follows:-
49 (l) The Bank may, when it considers such action 
necessary, Issue orders to control the volume, 
terms and conditions of credit extended by banks 
and, in the transaction of their business in 
Tanzania, the Bank shall comply with such orders. 
50 (l) The Bank may, when it considers suah. action necessary, 
Issue orders to control the volume, terms and 
conditions of credit (including instalment credit) 
extended through loans, advances or investments by 
specified financial institutions and, in the 
"transaction of their business in Tanzania, such 
institutions shall comply with such orders. 
The second section in each case provides for the gazetting of the 
instructions, for their uniform application, and specifies that the 
institutions concerned shall not be required to take any step to reduce 
any existing credit prematurely. The legal interpretation, if it should 
ever come to that, of the word 'prematurely' is an interesting speculation. 
The obvious interpretation is 'prior to maturity', but it is very doubtful 
whether that is what the drafters of the clause had in mind. If it were 
thus interpreted it would simply mean s. prohibition on new loans. However, 
it cannot be denied that the powers given to the Bank are comprehensive 
and it is questionable whether, with such general provision included in 
the legislation, it is necessary to specify any of the other particular 
controls which the Bank may employ. 
The general powers given to the Bank of Uganda are specified in 
Section 52 of the Act. 
2 (l) The Bank may, by statutory instrument, prescribe, 
(a) the maximum amounts of investments, loans, 
advances and bills and promissory notes dis-
counted whether applied in total or to any 
specified class or classes of such investments, 
loans, advances and bills and promissory notes 
discounted which each banking institution may 
have outstanding during such period as may be 
specified by the Bank; 
(b) the purpose for which loans and advances may 
be granted and the class of business underlying 
investments and bills and promissory notes 
discounted; 
(c) the maximum period of loans and advances and the 
type and minimum amount of security which shall 
be required; and the maximum tenor of bills and 
promissory notes discounted; 
(d) the maximum or minimum rates of interest and 
other charges which in the transaction of their 
business banking institutions may pay on any 
type of deposit or other liability and impose 
on credit extended in any form. 
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It is difficult to think of anything that a central bank would want 
to do by way of controlling banking institutions which is not included 
in this list, but the powers are not specified in the general terms whuch 
confer potential omnipotence upon the Banks of Tanzania and Kenya. One 
respect in which the powers given to the Bank of Uganda do seem to be 
defective is that they refer only to banking institutions. The definition 
of banking institutions given in Section 50, (interpretations) of the bill 
is that this term*includes the Uganda Commercial Bank and a bank licenced 
under the Banking Ordinance, 1955'„ This presumably means 'any bank 
licenced under the Banking Ordinance 1955", and it seems a little 
patronising to point out that the term includes the Uganda Commercial 
Bank but presumably it is not so licenced. However, it is clear that 
the term does not include non- bank financial intermediaries which are 
likely to be of increasing importance in the future development of the 
financial system,, 
Finally, we have to consider one of the most important provisions 
made in the legislation, that relating to the external reserves cf each 
central bankc We will first consider the specification of the compos! ti on 
of the foreign exchange reserve. 
In the case of the Bank of Tanzania the foreign exchange reserve 
must consist of any or all of the following: 
(a) gold; 
(b) convertible foreign exchange in the form of -
(i) demand or time deposits with foreign central 
banks, or with the banks' agents or corre-
spondents abroad; 
(ii) documents and instruments customarily used 
for the making of payments or transfers in 
international! transactions; 
(iii) notes or coins; 
(c) securities of, or guaranteed by, foreign governments 
or international financial organisations or insti-
tutions. 
The form of the convertible foreign exchange, and the kinds of secutities 
which may be held are to be determined by the Bank from time to time. 
The requirements for the Bank of Kenya are identical, except that, 
under the third general category (c) it is specified that the securities 
shall be 'convertible and marketableThe requirement that.the securities 
held by central banks should be those of foreign governments whose 
cerrency is convertible is a normal requirement and it is surprising that 
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it is not specified in the Tanzanian Act. The requirement that the 
.securities shall be marketable is not a usual provision in central 
bank legislat ion, but it seems to be an eminently sensible one. It Is 
not much use holding securities expressed in a convertible currency if it 
is impossible, at any reasonable price to convert such securities into 
the convertible currency. 
The stipulation in the case of the Bank of Uganda is similar to that 
of Tanzania, except that the composition of the reserve Is 
specified in more detail, and in respect of all foreign financial assets 
there is a clear specification that they must be of a country whose 
currency is sterling or is freely convertible into gold or sterling. 
It is further provided that securities should not exceed forty per cent 
of the total reserve, and that three quarters of these securities shall 
mature in periods not exceeding five years. Uganda therefore specifically 
provides, as does Kenya, for convertibility of the securities held in the 
foreign exchange reserve, and also specifies a measure of liquidity for 
such securities, but in a balance of payments crisis liquidity based upon 
a maturity under five years is not the same thing as marketability. 
However, this point is Lainly of academic'interest in view of 
the substantial minimum of foreign exchange reserve which must be 
held, for If some part of the foreign exchange can never be used by 
virtue of the minimum requirement, then neither the marketability nor 
the liquidity of this element is of much concern. 
All three counties specify a minimum foreign exchange reserve, but 
in rather different terms. Both the Tanzania and Kenya Acts stipulate 
that the Bank must 'use its best endeavours to maintain a reserve of 
external assets at an aggregate amount of not less than the value of four 
months imports'. Uganda however, imposes a rigid legal minimum, in the 
following terms: 'The value of the reserve of external assets specified 
in the preceeding subsection shall not be less than an amount equivalent 
to forty per centum nf the total demand liabilities of the Bank'. A clause 
added after the Bill was printed provides for the possibility that during 
the period of conversion the external assets taken over from the Currency 
Board may be less than the required proportion of liabilities. 
Converting these requirements into pounds, with the reservations that have 
previously been made about the imprecision of forecasting the actual level 
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of the Bank of Uganda's demand liabilities the results are as follows: 
£ Million Number of 
months imports 
Kenya 30.0 = 4 
Tanzania 17.0 = 4 
Uganda 9.0 = 2 
The whole concept of a minimum foreign exchange reserve is a very 
complicated one. In the first place it is arguable whether it is 
desirable in principle; in the second place it is arguable in whatiterras 
it should be set; and in the third place the appropriate level for such 
a stipulated reserve is very difficult to determine. It should be stressed 
that the last question is a quite seperate one from the question of the 
size of reserve at which a central bank should normally aim. 
The form of the specification of the minimum reserve requirement in 
the Tanzanian and Kenyan Acts is clearly intended to get over the basic 
disadvantage which is inherent in the stipulation of a minimum external 
reserve. That is the fact that, as soon as a minimum is stipulated, the 
specified amount of foreign exchange becomes immobilised for ever. 
Requiring a central bank to use its best endeavours to maintain a reserve 
of not less than a specified amount is quite a strong injunction in 
countries where the practice of informed public criticism is highly 
developed and it has the advantage that, in an emergency, which can be 
shown to be of short duration, the use of part of the stipulated reserve 
is possible and desirable. In opposition to this argument it is claimed 
that a provision requiring a minimum of foreign exchange to be held as an 
ultimate reserve is conducive to confidence in the currency. If this is 
so, then the confidence generated is either irrational or based upon the 
assumption that if the worst comes to the worst the requirement will be 
suspended. But in matters of foreign exchange, particularly in the minds 
of speculators, rationality is not the thing that matters: if, in the 
opinion of financiers, the strength of a currency depends on the Governor 
of the Central Bank burning yellow candles wearing a pink toga at midnight 
preceeding each meeting of the Board, then at midnight, wearing a pink 
toga, yellow candles, he must burn. A more rational argument for the 
legal minimum which is exemplified in the Uganda legislation is that it 
constitutes an unanswerable check to any pressures which may be brought to 
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bear upon'the Bank to increase credit l;eyond the point at which the reseve 
has been reduced to, or near to, the minimum point. This argument relates 
also to the second of the questions raised above in respect of the terms 
in which minimum external exchange requirements should be expressed. 
By relating the minimum reserve requirement directly to the liabilities 
of the Central Bank, any increase in credit after the point at which for-
eign reserves have fallen to the minimum point is actually illegal. The 
Central Bank cannot at ihatpoint expand its liabilities without breaking 
the law. This would apply even if it could be argued that the whole of 
the extra credit created would be confined within the economy- and lead 
to no deterioration in the external balance, because the expansion of 
credit v/culd, in itself, loy/er the ratio of foreign exchange, to liabilities 
below that specified., by virtue of the necessary increase in the Bank's 
liabilities. 
In this connection it may be pertinent to recall.that the..legal 
limit placed upon the Bank of England in respect of its note issue.:by 
the Bank Charter Act of 1844 had to be suspended on.three occasions during 
the nineteenth century, and the Governor of the Bank of England ha.d to..be 
indemnified by a subsequent Act of Parliament for having broken the Taw. 
Such a procedure can be obviated by stipulating that in cases of emergency 
and with the concurrence of the legislature the minimum provision can be 
suspended. The trouble is that the implementation of any such provjsi on 
would be likely to undermine confidence in the currency, and thus 
exacerbate the balance of payments position that it was designed to co. " 
correct. From this point of view the Tanzanian and Kenyan provision is 
to be preferred. Moreover if the provision is to be made as loose as 
this, then there is much to be said for specifying the reserve requirement 
in terms of Imports rather than in terms of an item in the ba.lance sheet. 
In order to make comparisons, the main parameters imposed on the ' 
monetary system by the central bank legislation are set out in Appendix two 
in respect of the three East African countries together with those of the 
remaining English-speaking African countries and the twenty-one countries 
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covered by Dr. Hans Aufricht's standard collection.-1- These parameters 
are taken tc be the specification of the limit on the central bank's capa-
city to create credit, and the specification of the minimum foreign 
exchange reserve. 
It is interesting to note that the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street 
operating in a international monetry centre in a very 'open' economy is 
bound by no minimum reserve requirement at all; indeed, the entire 
liabilities of the Bank of England are now backed only by-Government 
securities, and. the-foreign exchange reserves of the system .are seperately 
aoc«unted for by the Exchange Equalisation Account. The anly- legal 
constraint which has operated nn the Bank, of England's capacity £or credit 
creation during most ;f its history is the limitation of the.fiduciary 
note issue., under the Currency and Bank Notes Act, which, however provides 
that the Treasury may direct alterations, on the representation of the. 
Bank. In fact- this-has become a.formality for -the simple reason that the 
limitation is -on currency and-it is unthinkable the Bank should be placed < 
* 
in a position in which it wold have to default on its liabilities t<-> pay 
out Bank of England notes in exchange 1 or deposits held, by the commercial 
banks, to be effective the limit should be on total liabilities. 
The emptiness of the regulations prescribing the operations of the 
Bank of England bring to mind the immortal dialogue between Socrates and 
an Economist which sprang from the brilliant literary and analytical 
genius of D.H. Robertson. The passage,,, which-envisages an Economist 
.trying to explain the British monetary system of the-late thirties to 
2 a visiting Socrates from .Iviars, runs as follows: 
Socrates: I see that your chief piece of money carries: 
a legend affirming that it is a promise to pay the 
bearer the sum of one pound. What Is this thing a pound, 
of which payment is thcc promised? 
Economist: - A pc;und is the British unit of account,; 
S«crates: So there is,. I suppose, some concrete object 
which embodies more firmly that abstract-unit of 
x account than does this paper promise? 
Economist: There is no such object, 0 Socrates. 
1. Aufricht, Hans, Central Bank 
Legislation, T.Tvf.17. Washington 1961. 
V. R.Vb.-u. Ti.H. Essays in Monetary Theory. 
Staples and Staples, Ltd. London 1940. 
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Socrates: Indeed? Then what your lank promises is to give 
me another promise stairped with a different number in 
case I should regard the number stamped on this promise 
as in some way ill-omened? 
Economist: It would seem, indeed, to be promising something 
of that kind. 
Socrates: So that in order to be in a position to fulfil 
its promises all the Bank has to do is to keep a store 
of such promises stamped with all sorts of different 
numbers? 
Economist: By no means, Socrates - that would make its 
balance-sheet a subject for mockery, and in the eyes of 
our people there resides in a balance-sheet a certain 
awe and holiness. The Bank has to keep a store of 
Government securities. 
Socrates: What are Government securities? 
Economist: Promises by the Government to pay certain sums 
of money at certain dates. 
Socrates: What are sums of money? Do you mean Bank of 
England notes? 
Economist: I suppose I do. 
Socrates: So these promises to pay promises are thought to 
be in some way solider and more sacred than the promises 
themselves? 
Economist: They are so thought, as it appears. 
Socrates: Do you find that your monetary system works well? 
Economist: Pretty well, thank you, Socrates, on the whole. 
Socrates: That would be, I suppose, not because of the 
rather strange rules of which you have told me, but because 
it is administered by men of ability and wisdom? 
Economist: It would seem that that must be the reason, rather 
than the rules themselves, 0 Socrates. 
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